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This study explores the limitations of recognising traditional leadership as institution through 
legislation. The legislative recognition of traditional leadership has serious implications for 
the processes of change within customary law from ‘official’ customary law to ‘living’ 
customary law. The advent of the 1996 Constitution and its emphasis on freedom, dignity, 
equality and accountability has opened up avenues for democratic political participation, 
which is changing the nature of customary law through a bottom-up process involving 
community members in the evolution of customary law. This process of evolution draws on 
various sources of law, including aspects of official customary law, community norms and 
procedures as well as the Constitution, particularly rights discourse. Deep legal pluralism has 
taken root through living customary law and is changing the way in which community 
members relate to traditional leaders by empowering rural citizens to demand accountability 
from traditional leaders. 
Legislative recognition of traditional leadership has been characterised as necessary for the 
restoration of the dignity of African justice systems. Though constitutionally sanctioned 
through the rule of law, the legislative framework recognising and regulating traditional 
leaders has had a negative impact on the processes of change and democratisation described 
above at grassroots level. Gaining an understanding of these consequences and how they have 
come about is at the heart of this study, especially given that they are unintended 
consequences of a government policy meant to improve the lives of rural citizens. 
Legal pluralism as a theory of law provides a critical lens through which the shortcomings of 
legislation recognising traditional leadership can be perceived, and probing questions can be 
asked about the effect of state law on non-state legal orders. However, in South Africa the 
situation is quite complicated given that the distinction between state law and non-state law 
with regard to African customary law is not always easy to make. The two systems have 
existed not only in juxtaposition for many years, but have bled into each other in layered 
ways. These layers have been moulded very deeply through the influence of various politico-
legal orders in existence at particular times and their impact on social relations in South 
African society. As a theory of law, legal pluralism is used in this study to try and peel back a 
few of these layers, enabling observation and analysis of how the distribution of political 
power from the different politico-legal frameworks of governance in South Africa namely, 
iv 
 
colonialism, apartheid, and constitutional democracy, have shaped traditional leadership; and 
the impact of these processes on the power relationships between traditional leaders and rural 
citizens. 
Law, mostly in the form of legislation, has been an important factor in the establishment, 
destruction, and re-establishment of these power relationships. This forms the basis of the 
study, at the end of which it is determined that although legislation is necessary for the 
recognition and regulation of traditional leadership, as a requirement of the rule of law, the 
current and proposed legislative framework for traditional leadership is an inappropriate 
framework. It centralises legislative, judicial and executive power in an unelected arm of 
government, namely traditional leaders, which is unconstitutional on the basis of the 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
The topic for this study was inspired by the mass opposition presented by rural people’s 
movements when the Traditional Courts Bill was presented in different provinces for public 
consultation, and in the South African national Parliament. Many people were surprised by 
the vehement opposition of large numbers of citizens of rural South Africa to the Bill, the 
assumption always having been that traditional leaders and the communities in which they 
rule live in perfect, idyllic harmony. Rural citizens who opposed the Bill were not necessarily 
representative of all traditional communities, nor of whole traditional communities, but of 
sectors in traditional communities of which the groups they represented made up large 
numbers of rural citizens. Particularly, some of the larger and most vocal groups consisted of 
rural women’s movements and democratic communal land owners associations who own 
land within or adjacent to the territorial boundaries of a traditional community. Additionally, 
there were large numbers of rural citizens, not necessarily part of any movement, who were 
deeply disenchanted with particular traditional leaders, for abusing their power in a variety of 
ways, and seeking to impede processes of change occurring in their communities. These 
processes of change, often brought about by community members, and being of benefit to 
community members, usually threatened the power of the chief in some way, especially 
attempts by communities to hold traditional leaders accountable1. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this study is to gain greater insight into the realities in rural citizens’ lives that 
shaped and sparked the reactions noted above. It seems curious that people whose leaders 
were finally receiving the state recognition they deserved would react in the ways mentioned 
above; or was there more to the story? Has the legislative recognition of traditional leaders in 
fact had unintended negative consequences in the social realities of rural people? More 
specifically, what effect would the TCB have when interpreted along with the already 
existing legislative recognition of traditional leaders such as the Traditional Leadership and 
                                                          
1 For a more detailed description of these events please see Nolundi Luwaya ‘Report on the Traditional Courts 
Bill hearings: exploring rural people’s democratic participation and freedom of expression’ (2013) Issues in law 
and society Occasional Paper Series: issue 2. 
2 
 
Governance Framework Act (TLGFA)? Would this not result in a concentration of power in 
one institution, which is also unelected? What effect would this have on power dynamics 
between traditional leaders and their community members? Most importantly, does the draft 
and existing legislation adequately reflect the realities of the relationships between traditional 
communities and their leaders; or was the law presenting a picture of political neutrality, 
when in fact traditional communities are complicated spaces with intense political 
contestations of varying kinds? 
These are some of the questions the study grapples with, specifically: what impact has the 
legislation in the form of the TLGFA has had on relationships between traditional leaders and 
traditional communities; and the potential impact on these already existing relationships of 
additional legislation such as the Traditional Courts Bill (TCB) or Traditional Affairs Bill 
(TAB), and the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA). These issues also present questions 
about the relationship between constitutional democratic governance and traditional 
leadership, not so much about their compatibility, but about the possibilities and limitations 
of constitutional democracy in reshaping power relationships between traditional leaders and 
their communities in South Africa. Legislation has long been used in South Africa for the 
recognition of traditional leadership as an institution of governance, during the eras of late 
colonialism and apartheid, and the effects of this have been well documented. Why then, use 
the same approach in a political dispensation aimed at eradicating the effects of colonialism 
and apartheid in South Africa? 
 
Legislation and the Rule of Law: 
The questions raised in this study are important because they have direct implications on the 
relationship between legislation and the rule of law, particularly in Africa. The rule of law is 
a founding principle and provision of the South African Constitution2. It is also a principle 
fundamental to constitutional democratic governance, the politico-legal framework upon 
which South Africa’s democratic dispensation is based. The implication of this politico-legal 
framework is that the Constitution is supreme, and all law and conduct must be consistent 
with the Constitution3. The enactment of legislation for the implementation of government 
                                                          
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
3 s2, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
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policy is a crucial aspect of the rule of law, and respect for the supremacy of the constitution. 
The principle of legality, a procedural aspect of the rule of law, requires that laws should be 
certain, accessible and publicised4. One of the least challenging and transparent ways of 
doing this is by enacting statutes, hence legislation is a core part of constitutional democratic 
governance and state government.  
The rule of law is a substantive aspect of the concept of the supremacy of the constitution, as 
it is most easily measured or ascertained through the interpretation of legislation. The process 
of turning a Bill into law involves the interpretation and explanation of the Bill and its 
purpose to members of parliament, and to ordinary members of the public5. An additional 
reason why legislation is a core aspect of this study is because traditional leadership has been 




In order to engage meaningfully with the central question of this study, desktop research has 
been undertaken using books, journal articles, cases and legislation. This is because the study 
engages the effect of using legislation to confer recognition on an institution of leadership, 
whose practices are not uniform all over South Africa, yet the legislation is silent on this 
reality. Furthermore, a complex and ever-evolving theoretical concept is used in order to 
analyse the effects of legislation on the complex relationships between traditional leaders and 
their communities. Desktop research enables the study by allowing for a generalised 
discussion, as it is impossible for this study to account for the situational realities in all 
recognised and un-recognised traditional communities in South Africa. Primary and 
secondary written resources are used in the study. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Michel Rosenfeld “The rule of law and the legitimacy of constitutional democracy’ (2001) 74 Southern 
California Law Review 1307, 1307 
5 Ss 59 and 72 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: require the national assembly and 
national council of provinces respectively to facilitate public participation in law-making processes. 
6 Mahmoud Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996); 
Lungisile Ntsebeza Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the politics of land in South Africa (2005) 
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Structure of the Study 
This study consists of five chapters: 
Chapter One is an introductory chapter and is dealt with above. In Chapter Two, Legal 
pluralism as a theory of law is discussed. Allusions are made to legal pluralism as an 
empirical fact, at the same time as discussing it as a theory of law because in reality, the 
difference is not always easy distinguish. Legal pluralism tends to function as both empirical 
fact and theory of law at the same time in social situations. As a theory chapter, this section 
lays the foundation for the rest of the study, and the paradigm through which the problem at 
the heart of the study will be discussed. It will also be used as a means through which to 
suggest a solution to the problem identified in this study. 
Chapter Three explores legal pluralism in South African society during colonialism, 
apartheid, and under the Constitution is the focus of this chapter. The purpose is to gain a 
sense of how legal pluralism is and has been influenced by political changes expressed 
through law. Additionally, this chapter provides historical and political context for the issues 
raised in the theory chapter; as well as doing the same for the chapter which follows. This 
chapter maps the socio-legal and politico-legal processes that have shaped the current 
expressions of legal pluralism in contemporary South African society. 
Chapter Four: This is a critique and analysis chapter; in it legislation pertaining to the 
recognition of traditional leaders in South Africa’s constitutional democracy is discussed and 
analysed through the use of two court cases which function as case studies. These case 
studies demonstrate the limitations of recognising non-state legal orders using state law, and 
serve as further contextual examples of the problem this study grapples with. 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The conclusion chapter will provide a detailed summary of the problem identified as the basis 
for this study. It will also summarise the different issues discussed in the preceding chapters 







Chapter Two: Legal Pluralism 
 
Introduction 
Legal pluralism can exist in a society as an empirical fact7; and can be used as a descriptive 
theory of law to analyse and account for legal pluralism as an empirical fact. As an empirical 
fact, legal pluralism has existed for centuries, as a consequence of conquest, empire and state-
making. This is due to the fact that it is often easier for a conquering group to establish 
dominance over a conquered group using aspects of the conquered group’s laws, in 
combination with the conquering group’s laws. The ways in which the interaction of legal 
orders takes place, especially in relation to the flow of political power is at the heart of legal 
pluralism as a theory. Moreover, legal pluralism as theory is a lens with which to perceive the 
consequences of legal orders interacting and the effects of these interactions on social and 
political relations. 
The theory of legal pluralism has evolved rapidly over the last fifty years. At first it was 
mostly used to compare legal orders in a society as binaries8, and later used to analyse the 
relationships between legal orders and their impact on each other. This chapter is devoted to a 
discussion of legal pluralism as a descriptive theory of law. The theoretical contributions of 
particular authors to the theory of legal pluralism will be discussed in this chapter. Due to 
time and space limitations it is not possible at this instance to undertake a full review or map 
the entire conceptual field of legal pluralism. The theorists discussed in this chapter were 
selected on the basis of the level of coherence that could be established between their 
theoretical contributions to legal pluralism, and the issues this study seeks to engage. 
 
What Is Legal Pluralism? 
According to John Griffiths, in his aptly titled article ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’, one of the 
most damaging effects of legal centralist ideology is that societies and cultures that conceive 
of law differently to legal centralist thought, have had their systems of law and normative 
ordering rendered subordinate to state law or completely irrelevant because, ‘in the legal 
centralist conception, law is a systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative 
                                                          
7 Multiple forms of legal ordering exist in the same society 
8 Weak v Strong legal pluralism; African customary law as opposite or ‘other’ of European/ Western law. 
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propositions… it is the factual power of the state which is the keystone of an otherwise 
normative system, which affords the empirical condition for the actual existence of ‘law’.9” 
In order to justify its authority and its exclusive control of the legitimate use of force to 
coerce compliance, the state lays claim to the law as its exclusive domain, creating the 
perception that the factual power of the state is necessary for the existence of law. 
As a result, all other normative orders which claim to be ‘law’ are expected to resemble the 
legal centralist logic of law as it ought to be, rather than law as it is10. One of the concerns of 
legal pluralism is to grapple with what law actually is, rather than what it ought to be, 
because it is only once we ascertain what law is that a descriptive theory of law can be 
developed. Thus, in order for processes and normative orders to be studied or analysed, they 
must first be assessed against what state law says the law is, before they can be analysed on 
their own terms. This presents a serious problem as state law in itself is not a conception of 
what law is, but rather of what law, and its application in a situation, ought to be. A classic 
hallmark of state law and its presentation of law and social reality as they ought to be, is 
legislation: it defines terms in a manner that is value laden, and establishes a web or 
framework of relationships, usually consisting of rights and duties that flow in particular 
directions, usually from top to bottom. However, the social situation that legislation seeks to 
govern might often appear quite differently in reality, with definitions and terms meaning 
different things at different times, and the flow of relationships going in many different 
directions depending on circumstance. Relationships in social reality are complex and hybrid, 
changing their nature in reaction to different circumstances, as they change in time and space. 
The result of this state of affairs is that legal professionals, social scientists and students of 
law, and the social sciences, battle to observe that what state law presents as legal and social 
reality is not value neutral and immutable, but rather that the reality of law and the social 
situations it operates in are inconsistent and changeable and do not make for easy definition 
or interpretation11. One of the more damaging effects of the legal centralist ideology is that it 
questions the validity of legal orders which do not emanate directly from the state, by 
questioning whether they qualify as law at all. This often evident when speaking of the legal 
orders of non-western societies, such as African customary law, and indigenous law. 
                                                          
9 John Griffiths ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 24 Journal Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1, 3 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 4 
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Furthermore, by setting up a conception of state law as unified and hierarchically superior to 
the other forms of normative ordering, legal centralism leaves the door open, so to speak, for 
state law to co-opt other normative orders such as customary law, in order to entrench 
domination and assert a monopoly of meaning over other normative orders for its own 
purposes, 
a legal system is pluralistic when the sovereign (implicitly) commands… different 
bodies of law for different groups in the population. In general the groups concerned 
are defined in terms of features such as ethnicity, religion, nationality or geography, 
and legal pluralism is justified as a technique of governance on pragmatic grounds. 
Within such a pluralistic legal system, parallel legal regimes, dependent from the 
overarching and controlling state legal system, result from ‘recognition’ by the state 
of the supposedly pre-existing customary law of the groups concerned. While such 
pluralism is not limited to the colonial and post-colonial situation that is certainly 
where it is best known12. 
Legal centralist or state law based recognition of customary law creates problems for the 
development of a society’s customs as state law, usually in the form of legislation and court 
decisions, ascribes particular meanings to terms that, when used in the social context of a 
community, have fluid meanings which change depending on circumstance, but retain a core 
value. Indeed, state law recognition of non-state legal orders often co-opts customary law for 
particular purposes, and imposes on it false boundaries that require it to operate in 
specifically defined situations, which stifles the development and meaning of customary laws 
in social contexts13. This has significant implications in situations where a subgroup of the 
population can be further broken up into other categories such as clans, as the groups of 
people in the additional categories of the subgroup may follow some of the norms of the 
larger subgroups but not all of the, yet state law will apply all the norms uniformly. 
 
Griffiths’ conception of legal pluralism serves as a direct challenge to legal centralism, but 
also seeks to present an alternative to legal centralism, by establishing legal pluralism as a 
descriptive theory of law, and says of legal pluralism that it is not a situation in which more 
                                                          
12 John Griffiths ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1, 5-6 
13 Ibid, 6 
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than one rule is applicable to a situation. Legal pluralism is an attribute of a social field; it is 
the reality that in a social setting, multiple forms of law exist which emanate from different 
normative orders, without state law necessarily being the superior normative order, but just 
one of a number. In many instances though, and in tandem with legal centralism, state law 
tends to co-opt other legal orders in order to maintain its own claims to hegemony and 
maintain control of the interactions between legal orders. 
Griffiths completes his argument by making a definitive statement of what legal pluralism is. 
This particular conception of legal pluralism has come to shape and inform many studies of 
the relationship between normative orders and semi-autonomous social fields, especially by 
sociology of law scholars. Griffiths says of legal pluralism 
any sort of ‘pluralism’ necessarily implies that more than one of the sort of thing 
concerned is present within the field described. In the case of legal pluralism, more 
than one ‘law’ must be present. For reasons we have seen above, this cannot be 
conceived of as a situation in which more than one rule is applicable to the ‘same’ 
situation, for any such assertion is normative and not empirical. It identifies a 
situation in which law is non-uniform, not one of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism is 
an attribute of a social field and not of ‘law’ or a ‘legal system’. A descriptive theory 
of legal pluralism deals with the fact that within any given field, law of various 
provenance may be operative. It is when in a social field more than one source of 
‘law’, more than one legal order, is observable, that the social order of that field can 
be said to exhibit legal pluralism14. 
In Griffiths’ estimation, in order for legal pluralism to operate as a descriptive theory of law 
in a locality or situation, it is not enough for there to be more than one type of law that 
applies to the same situation: this merely reflects the non-uniformity of law. Rather, for legal 
pluralism to operate as a descriptive theory of law, the social field must be one in which a 
variety of laws or normative orders operate. Legal pluralism as a descriptive theory of law is 
concerned more with the normative orders operating in a social field, how they come together 
and most importantly how these processes shape realities and relationships in the social field, 
rather than the applicability of different types of law in the same situation. 
 
                                                          
14 John Griffiths; ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1, 38 
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Refinement of Legal Pluralism as a Theory: Weak and Strong Legal Pluralism 
 
Anne Griffiths contributes to the discussion about legal pluralism as a descriptive theory of 
law by engaging with the conceptions of legal pluralism as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’15. Her 
approach is a development on John Griffiths’ conception of legal pluralism. However, rather 
than declare ‘weak’ legal pluralism as not really legal pluralism, and ‘strong’ legal pluralism 
as the real manifestation of legal pluralism as a descriptive theory of law, Anne Griffiths sees 
the two conceptions as opposite ends of a continuum. ‘Weak’ legal pluralism, is legal 
pluralism in the form in which the state co-opts the law of non-state legal orders in order to 
impose its own dominance and superiority, usually by creating clear boundaries between the 
legal orders, and defining in which situations the rules of different legal orders will apply. 
Anne Griffiths is particularly concerned with the way power is expressed and entrenched 
using the different stages along the legal pluralism continuum. 
 
Weak Legal Pluralism 
Weak legal pluralism, as one end of the spectrum, is often used by elites and the state to exert 
control over the way law develops as state law and non-state law, in order to maintain or 
establish a monopoly over economic and political power. When a society moves along the 
continuum, away from weak legal pluralism and towards strong legal pluralism, power 
relationships in society are changing especially concerning the law, and who has the power to 
influence state and non-state law. At the stages along the continuum towards strong legal 
pluralism different groups of people are able to engage with power at various levels and in a 
variety of ways, thus breaking up the monopoly of meaning previously held by elite groups. 
These processes disturb the mono-directional flow of influence between legal orders from 
state to non-state, and evidence a multi-directional flow of influence. 
The authority of the state to define the boundaries between legal orders, at its most basic 
level, was upheld through the power to impose or enforce sanctions, best expressed through 
the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This approach presents law as solely 
reliant on the state for its validity and legitimacy; it presents law as a self-creating and self-
sustaining universe with its own professionals, specialists and institutions, set apart from 
                                                          




society and in no way informed by alternative normative orders. If anything, it is law in this 
formalist sense that validates or legitimises other normative orders, not the processes and 
societies that create them16. One of the great problems with this model is that it presents the 
state as the sole source of legitimacy and validity for rules and norms governing society, even 
if a society is made up of diverse cultural groups, some of which may have pre-existed the 
formation of the nation-state, which can lead to many societies being described as being 
without law, despite exhibiting high levels of social organisation and methods of managing 
conflict amongst their members. A more constructive approach wold be one that takes 
account of the role state law has to play in normative ordering without necessarily being the 
centre of the legal universe, but in a way that engages with other sources of normative 
ordering and rule generation. 
 
Strong or Deep Legal Pluralism 
The strong, deep or new approach to legal pluralism is suggested as a method for addressing 
the centralist approach to law, ‘by recognising that legal pluralism exists in all societies, that 
is, that there are multiple forms of ordering that pertain to members of a society that are not 
necessarily dependent upon the state for recognition of their authority.17’ The method 
provided by this approach to legal pluralism allows for an engagement with a variety of 
forms of normative ordering in addition to, and in relation to, the state. It allows for greater 
interaction between normative orders and for greater observation of the porosity of legal 
orders. When conceived in this way, legal pluralism operates on two levels: as an observable 
empirical fact; and as a descriptive theory of law. 
A widely favoured concept suggested as a framework for strong legal pluralism is Sally Falk 
Moore’s concept of the semi-autonomous social field. Moore did not specifically develop this 
concept as a framework for legal pluralism, however it has nevertheless found great 
resonance in legal pluralist scholarship and research as it provides a framework that avoids 
the criticisms levelled against the state centralist model of legal pluralism. The semi-
autonomous social field is described as a ‘social unit that generates and maintains its own 
norms’ thus overcoming the challenge of relying on the state to validate or legitimise a 
                                                          
16 Anne Griffiths ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Reza Banakar et al (eds) An Introduction to Law and Social Theory 
(2002) 1, 290 
17 Ibid, 302 
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society’s normative or legal orders. The semi-autonomous social field is located in a social 
setting, usually a community with a definable identity. It has the ability to generate its own 
customs, symbols and rules within its social and identity boundaries, but is also susceptible to 
rules, decisions and symbols which emanate from the larger world of which it forms a part. It 
is a social space which, in addition to rule-making, has the methods and means to induce 
compliance, but also exists in a wider world that influences it in a variety of ways and from a 
variety of sources18.  
The popularity of this concept as a framework for strong legal pluralism lies in the way that it 
shifts the focus of observation away from state centralist perspectives of law, while not 
completely excluding the role this perspective of law plays within the semi-autonomous 
social filed. By breaking the stranglehold of state-centralist conceptions of legal pluralism, 
room is created for the development of a ‘descriptive and analytical framework of legal 
pluralism’ by allowing for the relationship between state law and other law or normative 
orders to be redefined, and has been applied and developed by other scholars observing 
processes of change involving state and non-state law within particular social fields. 
 
The “what is law?” Conundrum 
 
One of the major critiques levelled against legal pluralism as a descriptive theory of law is 
that it is unable to answer the question “what is law?” The inability of legal pluralism to 
answer this question is seen as a major stumbling block to its claims of validity as a 
conceptual theory of law. John Griffiths attempted to answer this question on the basis of 
Moore’s analysis of the semi-autonomous social field that  
it follows that law is the self-regulation of a ‘semi-autonomous social field’. The 
idea that only the law of the state is law ‘properly so called’ is a feature of the 
ideology of legal centralism and has for empirical purposes nothing to be said for it. 
Distinctions can, where appropriate, be made between more or less differentiated 
forms of law. The self-regulation of a semi-autonomous social field can be regarded 
as more or less ‘legal’ according to the degree to which it is differentiated from the 
                                                          
18 Anne Griffiths ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Reza Banakar et al (eds) An Introduction to Law and Social Theory 
(2002). At 303, Griffiths gives a description of Sally Falk Moore’s concept of the semi-autonomous social field. 
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rest of the activities in the field and delegated to specialized functionaries. But 
differentiated or not ‘law’ is present in every ‘semi-autonomous social field’, and 
since any society contains many such social fields, legal pluralism is a universal 
feature of social organization19. 
The way Griffiths reasons it, in the semi-autonomous social field, law is the way in which the 
social fields regulate themselves or rather, what the actors in the social fields deem to be the 
regulations of processes and relationships in the social field, especially if particular forums 
and persons are designated with the functions of maintaining consensus on what the 
regulations are within the social fields. 
 
Tamanaha, a major critic of legal pluralism as a theory of law, is of the opinion that although 
the question of what constitutes law for the most part remains unresolved in legal philosophy, 
and he concedes that this question might never be answered. Despite this concession, and the 
fact that the same problem plagues positivist law, Tamanaha is dismissive of John Griffiths’ 
theory of legal pluralism because, according to Tamanaha, the ‘what is law’ question is 
central to legal pluralisms theoretical foundation. Having an unresolved, and seemingly 
unresolvable question at its core, renders legal pluralism a theory on ‘tenuous footing’ as 
Tamanaha puts it20. He does not dispute the empirical existence of legal pluralism, the reality 
that different normative orders can exist in one locality, and perhaps ascribes to a view of 
legal pluralism in the weak sense. What Tamanaha disputes is the validity of legal pluralism 
as a social scientific theory of law.  
Tamanaha goes on to explain that the problem is not so much that legal pluralists are unable 
to answer the question ‘what is law?’, considering that Griffiths himself attempts to provide 
an answer; and legal philosophy itself is unable to provide an answer to the question. Rather, 
the problem, according to Tamanaha, is that legal pluralists have taken different approaches 
to answering the question and provided different answers, which has led to a level of 
incoherency to legal pluralism as a descriptive theory of law. Perhaps rather than render legal 
pluralism a conceptual theory on ‘tenuous footing’, there needs to be greater engagement 
                                                          
19 John Griffiths ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1, 38 
20 Brian Tamanaha; ‘Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’ (2008) St John’s 
University Legal Studies Research Paper Series 1, 30 
13 
 
with why there are such differing approaches to answering the question of what law is. 
Perhaps it is this very problem that indicates the reality of what legal pluralists have been 
trying to grapple with: the existence of many forms of law in social fields. Should the 
question be ‘what is law?’, or would a more constructive approach be ‘what is law to the 
actors in the social fields?’ Approaching the question this way avoids placing too great an 
emphasis on legal centralist notions of what law is, while still allowing for investigation to be 
led into what law is within ‘semi-autonomous social fields’. Take, for example, the South 
African situation in which there is so called ‘official customary law’ as practiced by the state, 
and ‘living customary law’. Official customary law tends to operate at state level but is not 
entirely reflective of the norms people in traditional communities live by, which is living 
customary law. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on investigating the legitimacy of 
normative orders and the norms they establish, rather than whether norms are law or not, and 
the ways in which the norms are integrated through contact between different semi-
autonomous social fields. 
The benefit of this approach is that rather than placing too great an emphasis on the validity 
of the normative orders on the basis of their relationship in relation to state law, greater 
emphasis is placed on the ways in which different power dynamics play out within the 
normative orders and between them, as well as between actors and institutions within the 
normative orders, ad actors and institutions between the normative orders. This approach 
takes legal pluralism in all the forms suggested in Anne Griffiths’ continuum, from ‘weak’ 
legal pluralism to ‘strong’ legal pluralism, as a fact. It thus shifts the focus of enquiry from 
what legal pluralism and law are, to what legal pluralism and law do in social fields. 
Describing how Sally Falk Moore’s concept of the semi-autonomous social field has been 
beneficial to legal pluralism as a theory of law, Merry suggests that strong legal pluralism is 
no longer concerned with the effect of law on society, but rather with how we think about and 
understand the interactions between state and non-state law in complex ways, and thinking 
about the spaces in which these interactions take place as semi-autonomous social fields 
shifts the focus in a way that enables observation of how interaction between legal fields 
affects social change21. Additionally, through this perspective it is possible to understand why 
                                                          
21 Sally Engle Merry ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869, 878 here Merry describes the 
functionality of Moore’s concept of the semi-autonomous social field. 
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the enactment of new laws, or deliberate attempts at change, result in unforeseen outcomes22. 
Moore’s approach concept is highly effective when through field work for the purposes of 
empirical research, as it enables exposure of the layered nature of law, official and unofficial, 
when it is understood through a contextual reality. The layers of interpretation and meaning 
can be peeled back when observed through the eyes of the law-makers, law-users and law 
interpreters. Community settings involving dispute resolution forums and practices lend 
themselves particularly well to this analysis. 
Writing about the establishment and role of community courts, or ‘legal hybridization in 
Mozambique, De Sousa Santos makes the following point: 
‘in Africa ‘the disjunction between the officially established unity of the legal 
system and the sociological plurality and fragmentation of the legal practice is 
probably more visible there than in any other developing region of the world… this 
disjunction has a multiple impact on state action and legitimacy, on the operation of 
the official legal system, on the relationships between political and administrative 
control, on the mechanisms of conflict resolution operating in society, on the legal 
and institutional frameworks of economic life, and on the social and cultural 
perceptions of politics and legality.23’ 
This statement makes clear that simply recognising normative orders by differentiating the 
types of law operative in their communities and recognising their institutions, is no longer a 
viable approach to legal pluralism in Africa today. This method was sufficient during 
colonialism as the aim was to exploit the differences between racial and cultural groups in 
order to further racial segregation and entrench it. However, after the end of colonialism, 
many societies in Africa still have different race and cultural groups that have to find ways to 
co-exist peacefully, yet form cultural or religious communities. Therefore, a deeper more 
sensitive approach has to be taken to recognising the normative orders emanating from these 
different communities, and do so in a manner that encourages diversity within one society 
with shared citizenship. This also has to take place in a manner in which these different 
                                                          
22 Sally Falk Moore ‘Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate field of study’ 
(1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719, 723 
23 Boaventura De Sousa Santos ‘The heterogeneous state and legal pluralism in Mozambique’ (2006) 40 Law 
and Society Review 39, 40 
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normative orders, and their dispute resolution forums and laws, can still translate into the 
positivist/ state law paradigm, especially when matters are adjudicated in the state law courts. 
De Sousa Santos suggests interlegality as a way of understanding deep legal pluralism. His 
basic premise is that legal pluralism exists in all societies, whether officially recognised or 
not, as there can be any number of forms of ordering which are prominent in the publics’ 
lives but do not derive authority from the state. Thinking about legal pluralism as ‘porous 
legality’ places greater emphasis on the ways in which different legal spaces and values inter-
mingle, share knowledge and combine to form new experiences and ideas of law.  
 
Conclusion: 
The existence of legal pluralism in all societies is an undisputed fact. Complications and 
contestations come in to play about legal pluralism as a theory of law. As societies have 
become more complex, legal pluralism as a theory of law has gained prominence as a means 
through which to observe the interactions between legal and social spaces. Despite doubts 
about its validity as a theory, legal pluralism has displayed a great amount of resilience, and 
been developed beyond what was originally imagined it could do. Its popularity and 
resilience lie in its malleability and adaptability to different social situations. This is because 
it is a remarkably flexible theory, which enables research into law as a social phenomenon in 
a wide variety of settings. Furthermore, it enables observation of social processes and their 
effects on law within the context of real life situations. Only a few contributors to the concept 
have been discussed above due to space and time constraints, but also because legal pluralism 










Chapter Three: Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand legal pluralism in South African society as an 
empirical fact, and as a descriptive theory of law before the advent of constitutional 
democracy, and afterwards. Legal pluralism during colonialism, and especially during 
apartheid, took a particular form and was often marshalled for particular political purposes. It 
could be said that legal pluralism existed in the weak sense as a form of state-centralist legal 
ideology, used to maintain the dominance of the state’s claims to legitimacy despite evidence 
to the contrary, and for the exclusion of a group of people on the basis of race. This part of 
the chapter will look at some of the laws enacted in South Africa between 1910 when the 
Union of South Africa was established, and 1970 when the Bantu Homelands Citizens Act 
was enacted. The reason for selecting this particular period in South African legal history, is 
that it was during this time that racial segregation, entrenched through institutional 
segregation, became a clearly defined agenda in South African politics, and was acted upon 
with determination through a system of laws and institutions. 
Additionally, the possibilities for strong legal pluralism in post-apartheid South Africa will be 
engaged by analysing how the 1996 Constitution has changed the political, legal and social 
landscapes of South African society, creating an environment more conducive to strong legal 
pluralism. It is acknowledged in the 1996 Constitution24 that South Africa is a plural society. 
Not just racially, but culturally, religiously, and linguistically, to mention a few ways in 
which plurality operates in South African society. Furthermore, South Africa has been a 
plural society for a very long time, although in the past plurality and difference were 
understood and used in negative ways, to keep different people apart and entrench racial 
domination. The Constitution does not explicitly refer to or recognise legal pluralism in South 
African society, however it can be inferred from the way diversity and difference are 
protected in the Bill of Rights, and the emphasis placed in the Constitution, on the inherent 
dignity and equality of all people, especially given South Africa’s past and the declaration in 
the preamble to the Constitution that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our 
diversity.25’ A commitment to strong legal pluralism is also evident in the ways in which 
                                                          
24 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
25 Constitution of South Africa, 1996, Preamble 
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legislation has been enacted to recognise a variety of religious and cultural norms, through 
judgments of the Constitutional Court, and through policy. However, these attempts have 
taken place piecemeal, due to a number of factors, mostly political, which impinge on 
processes deepening legal pluralism in South African society.  
 
Legal pluralism has been a feature of South African law, since the first Dutch settlers arrived 
in South Africa at the Cape of Good Hope, South Africa became a sovereign state with plural 
state laws in 1910 when the Union of South Africa was established as a British colony. 
‘[F]rom a comparative-law perspective, South Africa can be described as a mixed jurisdiction 
for its “common” law derives from two European systems, English and Dutch’26; and a 
separate body of law for the black African population, usually based on African customary 
law, or some version of it. 
 
Shortly after the establishment of the union government, institutional segregation was 
adopted as a policy of governance in South Africa27. Mamdani describes institutional 
segregation as ‘a politically enforced system of ethnic pluralism… as a way to stabilize racial 
domination (territorial segregation).28’ One of the methods employed in the implementation 
of institutional segregation by the Union government was to create a separate system of law 
for black African people in the form of African customary law, ‘the Native Administration 
Act made customary law applicable nation-wide, but only in a special system of courts 
constituted by traditional leaders and native commissioners. This regime was given its 
decidedly racist stamp by a rule that these courts had jurisdiction over blacks only, and only 
blacks could be subject to customary law.29’ A fundamental feature of this policy was the 
separation of land for black people in order to create the territorial jurisdictions necessary for 
the application of a separate system of law for black people, and the furtherance of an 
institutionally and racially segregated society in South Africa: ‘Africans were prohibited from 
                                                          
26 T.W. Bennett ‘Law in the Face of Cultural Diversity: South Africa’ in Marie-Claire Foblets (ed) Cultural 
Diversity and the Law: State Responses from around the World (2010) 1, 17 
27 Mahmoud Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996) 5 
28 Ibid 
29 T. W. Bennett ‘Law in the Face of Cultural Diversity: South Africa’ in Marie-Claire Foblets (ed) Cultural 
Diversity and the Law: State Responses from Around the World (2010) 1, 21 
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buying or leasing land outside certain “scheduled zones”. Areas demarcated under this law, 
and the subsequent Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, provided the core of the future 
bantustans (which thereafter became the independent or semi-independent homelands)30.  
The ‘scheduled zones’ or bantustans, as they would later be called, forced black people to 
live in specific localities, usually on the basis of belonging to a certain ethnic group, or 
tribe31, and this process has often been branded ‘retribalisation’32 due to the fact that by the 
time this policy was entrenched as law by the Bantu Homelands Citizens Act33, many 
Africans had become westernized having been exposed to Christianity and Western education 
through mission schooling, in addition to urbanisation due to migration to the newly 
established cities in search of wage labour. 
In fact, a professional, educated black middle class, albeit it small, was growing in South 
Africa, and although this black middle class in many ways still identified with African culture 
and tradition34, it nevertheless also took advantage of capitalist modernity35. The gold mining 
economy was growing rapidly in South Africa and would need cheap labour to maximise 
profits from the minerals mining industry, which was capital intensive. Furthermore, the 
growing black middle class had begun to compete with white farmers and professionals, and 
in order to stem this tide, and provide cheap labour for the mines, racial and institutional 
segregation, especially where land and public administration were concerned, could be used 
to solve the problem of economic competition, the need for cheap labour, and keep the 
colonial government’s administration costs down. By forcing black people onto the reserves 
or ‘scheduled zones’ where they could not own land, black people would only be allowed to 
inhabit urban areas as labourers, and public administration could be centralised in customary 
                                                          
30 T.W. Bennett ‘Law in the Face of Cultural Diversity: South Africa’ in Marie-Claire Foblets (ed) Cultural 
Diversity and the Law: State Responses from Around the World (2010) 1, 21 
31 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 46 of 1959 
32 T.W. Bennett ‘Law in the Face of Cultural Diversity: South Africa’ in Marie-Claire Foblets (ed) Cultural 
Diversity and the Law: State Responses from Around the World (2010) 1, 21 
33 Bantu Homelands Citizens Act 26 of 1970 
34 T.W. Bennett ‘Law in the Face of Cultural Diversity: South Africa’ in Marie-Claire Foblets (ed) Cultural 
Diversity and the Law: State Responses from Around the World (2010) provides a brief historical description of 
the development of a black middle class in South Africa before apartheid. 
35 Lungisile Ntsebeza Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in South Africa (2005) 
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law custodian of land, the chief, thus significantly reducing administration costs for the 
colonial government36. 
The Union and apartheid governments forced black people onto reserves, denying them rights 
to own land individually37 as a means to entrench institutional segregation: black people were 
subjected to a different set of laws and institutions, curtailing full and equal citizenship of 
South Africa. To achieve this end, the application of customary law to black people’s private 
and civil affairs within the law was insufficient, a whole body of administration and authority 
was needed in order to fully actualise institutional segregation. A body of laws, the most 
prominent of which were the Black Administration Act38, and the Bantu Authorities Act39, 
was part of the colonialist  
‘state’s production of a customary law [which] was a fundamental and powerful 
intervention in the way in which African life could and would develop under white 
rule. African tribal authorities and family heads in the countries around South 
Africa, and inside it, needed the weight of state power to enforce the customary 
family law. Without this power the practices of young men and women, of divorcees 
and widows, all of whom struggled against aspects of the maintained patriarchy, 
would clearly be visible as custom. Nowhere in the rest of Africa has customary law 
been invoked to advance egalitarian social relations. Its use has been to resist the 
developing customary practices which were overwhelming customary law,40’ 
 
and overwhelming the ability of the colonial government in South Africa to keep the 
development of an economically active and empowered black section of society at bay. 
Indeed, ‘the South African legal system has been overtly based upon the principle that 
differing cultural groups do in some way naturally “have” and require different laws. Varying 
                                                          
36 Mahmoud Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996), 7. 
The system of rule by chiefs in place of colonial administration commonly known as ‘indirect rule’ in British 
colonial policy. 
37 Native Land Act 27 of 1913 
38 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 
39 Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951 
40 Martin Chanock ‘Law, State and Culture: Thinking About ‘Customary Law’ After Apartheid’ (1991) 52 Acta 
Juridica 52, 55 
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versions of African law have been constructed and applied by a process of mutual interaction 
between white politicians, and officials, and African traditional elites.41’ 
Under colonial and apartheid government in South Africa, legal pluralism was shaped in the 
legal centralist mould, and used for very particular ends. Perhaps the aim when colonial 
government was established, was not so much dispossession of black people’s land rights, 
and curtailment of their citizenship in South Africa. It is likely that for early colonial 
government representatives, their initial strategy had been to recognise the African customary 
law of the indigenous people, in order to ward off resistance to colonial domination, and to 
reduce the administrative burden of running a colony. However, it cannot be denied that there 
came a point when the colonial, and subsequently the apartheid government, systematised 
and controlled legal pluralism through state law, for the purpose of entrenching a particular 
political and economic vision of South African society. 
Whether it was intended or not, the effect of shaping legal pluralism in this way has had 
negative consequences. It has led to the calcification and essentialisation of African 
customary law42, as particular aspects of the law43 were presented in legislation as 
unchanging, particularly the relationship between traditional leaders and their communities. 
Moreover, the greatest damage inflicted by this approach to legal pluralism, is the idea that an 
African cultural or traditional community cannot exist without a traditional leader in whom 
administrative, judicial and legislative power are centralised; and that the legitimacy and 
authority of traditional leaders are not disputed at varying moments in time. 
 
The 1996 Constitution and Legal Pluralism: Scope for Deep Legal Pluralism 
 
A key question this section seeks to address is whether the 1996 Constitution of South Africa 
establishes a legal order that resonates with conception of legal pluralism as strong legal 
pluralism? Put differently, can the legal order in the 1996 Constitution be analysed in terms 
                                                          
41 Ibid 56 
42 Rachel Zimmerman; ‘The Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa: Method and Discourse’ (2001) 
17 Harvard Blackletter Law Journal 197, 205 
43 Much of the statute relating to customary law generated during colonialism and apartheid relied on particular 
interpretations of customary law, and ascribed defined meanings to certain concepts. This has severely 
diminished the fluid and evolving nature of customary law in official discourse, emanating the concept of 
‘official customary law’ which is customary law applied by the state and lower courts.  
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of a social-scientific theory of law such as the form of legal pluralism in which various 
sources of law combine in a semi-autonomous social field, not just state law conceptions of 
non-state legal orders? 
 
In seeking to establish a society and legal system that is plural in the deep sense, recognition 
of cultural rights is but a step along a continuum. Further steps must be taken, especially to 
bring plural legal orders into closer contact with the state legal system. One of the effective 
ways of doing this is by recognising the dispute resolution forums which emanate from these 
normative orders through law. In the South African context, it appears that state law has an 
important role to play in the recognition of normative orders operating outside of state law, 
not in order to legitimise them as they are already legitimate in the eyes of the communities 
that use them, but in order to broaden the number of forums available for the management of 
dispute and conflict within communities, to lessen the burden on police and the courts, but 
most importantly to give people a sense that they can resolve disputes efficiently, cost 
effectively and in a manner that resonates with the communal spirit of reconciliation and 
restoration of dignity to both the victim and the victor. However, this system needs to be 
integrated within the larger framework of state law, so that when there are crimes involved 
that are also of interest to the state, these crimes can be investigated and tried within the state 
legal system, but having also involved the parties in the justice process. Recognition of 
community centred dispute resolution forums allows justice to operate and flow on different 
levels within society. 
 
The preamble to the 1996 Constitution states that ‘South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
united in our diversity,44’ and seeks to ‘lay the foundations for a democratic and open society 
in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected 
by law.45’ Furthermore, s1 of the Constitution states that ‘the Republic of South Africa is one, 
sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms; and (c) supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
                                                          




Section 246 of the Constitution entrenches supremacy of the Constitution as the founding 
principle upon South African law is founded, thus moving South Africa away from the 
system of Parliamentary Sovereignty which was the source of authority for all law under the 
pre-democratic South African constitution, and which was often abused by the executive arm 
of government under the same political dispensation. Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution 
states categorically that ‘this Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic (of South 
Africa); law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must 
be fulfilled.47’ 
One of the revolutionary aspects of the 1996 Constitution, especially given the history of law 
and constitutionalism since the establishment of the South African nation-state, is the Bill of 
Rights. It establishes a legal framework for the protection and promotion of fundamental 
human rights enforceable vertically48 and, more importantly horizontally49, and can only be 
derogated from in terms of a limitations clause which sets out a specific test50 which must be 
met in order to justifiably limit rights in the Bill of Rights. 
The 1996 Constitution provides scope for deep legal pluralism, at least in the sense that it 
lays the foundation for a legal culture that recognises difference and diversity, and attempts to 
manage diversity in positive ways. Indeed, despite chapter 1251 of the Constitution, the 
document itself leaves open the ways in which recognition of cultural, religious and linguistic 
rights can be actualised and recognised institutionally; this task is left to parliament and civil 
society to manage. Progressively utilised, this deep approach to legal pluralism will give a 
more accurate reflection of South African society, and the type of society envisioned in the 
Constitution. 
The 1996 Constitution further envisions a framework of governance based on openness, 
accountability and transparency in law-making processes. The national, provincial and local 
                                                          
46 Section 2, “Supremacy of the Constitution”; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
47 Ibid s2; emphasis my own. 
48 The Bill of Rights was held to be applicable against the state and private bodies. 
49 Often deemed to be a particularly revolutionary aspect of the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution is its 
enforceability between private citizens. 
50 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) 
51 Chapter dealing with traditional leadership. Section 212, contained in this chapter, requires that national and 
provincial legislation be enacted to provide a role for traditional leaders in government. 
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levels of governance in South Africa52 are constitutionally required to facilitate public 
participation in their law-making and implementation processes. The Constitution suggests 
methods for the facilitation of this duty such as public consultations, and notice and comment 
procedures; however, it does not specify which method government should adopt, but states 
that it is up to government to decide which approach would be best, depending on the type of 
legislation being enacted, and how significant its political implications are. However, it has 
been decided and confirmed in South African law, especially in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court, that the facilitation of public participation in the law-making process is 
a fundamental aspect of the process53, and legislation has been struck down and declared 
unconstitutional by the Court because government did not facilitate public participation 
sufficiently, or at all. 
The question this section began with is whether the Constitution provides a politico-legal 
environment conducive to strong or modern legal pluralism? The provisions listed above are 
the provisions that most clearly demonstrate that the 1996 Constitution does envision a plural 
legal order, and provides for a legal landscape made up of various normative and alternative 
legal orders, through the establishment of a matrix of legal institutions and rights that enable 
citizens to hold the state, private institutions, and each other accountable. However, of great 
significance is the way in which the Constitution recognises cultural, communal rights and 
envisions scope for institutions of authority such as traditional leaders to form part of the 
South African governance framework. Sections 3054 and 3155 of the Constitution recognise 
the right of individuals and communities to belong to religious, cultural, and linguistic 
communities. As recognised rights, surely these provisions should play a major role in 
shaping legal pluralism in South African society, from weak legal pluralism as existed under 
colonialism and apartheid, to strong legal pluralism which is enabled by the current 
                                                          
52 Sections 59, 72 and 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
53 Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (5) 
SA 171 (CC); Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa 2007 (1) BCLR 47 
(CC); Doctors For Life International v Speaker of National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) 
54 Section 30 recognises an individual’s right to use a language and participate in the cultural right of their 
choice, in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights. 
55 This right protects people who make the choice belong to cultural, linguistic, and religious communities; 
while also protecting the right to ‘form, join, and maintain cultural, linguistic, and religious groups’, subject to 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
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Constitution56. Why then, is this not the case? Why have attempts to deepen legal pluralism 
under the constitutional democratic order so closely resembled apartheid and colonial legal 
pluralism? An explanation for this may be that the laws entrenching legal pluralism during 
apartheid and colonialism were imported into the constitutional democratic order, to the 
extent that they were not inconsistent with the Constitution. New legislation was only 
introduced nearly ten years57 after the advent of the Constitution. Meanwhile, major changes 
have been underway at community and court level, with judgments such as the Bhe58 
Constitutional Court judgment, and the Constitutional Court’s living law jurisprudence being 
applied to customary law matters, has deepened legal pluralism59, without transforming some 
of its institutions like traditional leadership. This has led to resistance and lobbying by 
traditional leaders for legislation that recognises their authority and entrenches their positions 
of power in communities. This is a strategy designed to stem the tide of the social changes 
brought about by the Constitution, the Constitutional Court’s progressive jurisprudence, and 
mobilisation and activism at community level for greater democracy and community 
participation in decision-making and defining the content of customary law. 
 
Conclusion 
Legal pluralism has existed as an empirical fact in South Africa for a very long time. 
However, as a descriptive theory of law it is affected in profound ways by the socio-political 
and politico-legal environments operates in as demonstrated by the impact colonialism and 
apartheid, and their allocations of political and social power through state law. Legal 
pluralism was co-opted by the colonial and apartheid governments for the purpose of 
entrenching dominance over groups of people, and for the maintenance of the state’s claims 
to hegemony and legitimacy, in a climate in which there was great resistance to the state’s 
claims by a section of society. Moreover, the state’s reliance on legal centralist ideology for 
the purpose of entrenching weak legal pluralism has had devastating effects on the nature of a 
body of non-state law: African customary law. The effect of colonial and apartheid state law 
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entrenchment of customary is pervasive, and proving very difficult to remedy even under a 

























Chapter Four: Traditional Leadership Institutional Framework Analysis 
 
Introduction 
National legislation as required by s212 of the Constitution, has been enacted in South Africa 
to give effect to the role of traditional leaders, in the form of the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act60 (TLGFA); the Traditional Courts Bill61 (TCB), has yet to be 
enacted but is before parliament for discussion. The Communal Land Rights Act62 (CLRA) 
came into effect, but was found to be unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in the 
Tongoane63 case. The CLRA was not intended specifically for the recognition of traditional 
leadership; it was designed to provide security of tenure to people living on communal land. 
However, it is relevant to the discussion in this chapter as it gave traditional councils, 
previously known as tribal authorities, a role in the administration of communal land. 
Furthermore, the communally owned land often falls within the apartheid era boundaries of 
traditional communities, giving rise to claims by traditional leaders that communal land, and 
the people living on it fall under the authority of a traditional leader. 
 
The recognition of traditional leadership institutions through legislation has not been a 
seamless process, or rather, contrary to the harmony and simplicity depicted in the legislation, 
there have been incidents of opposition to traditional leaders legitimacy and recognition in 
some communities. The seeds of discord in traditional communities emanate from a number 
of sources, lack of accountability on the part of traditional leaders to their people being a 
large source of disaffection. Two cases, Tongoane and Others v Minister of Agriculture and 
Land Affairs and Others, and Pilane and Another v Pilane and Another, both of which were 
decided in the Constitutional Court, are discussed in this chapter as case studies illustrating 
the issues raised above. These cases also serve as context-based, real life examples of the 
complexities of legal pluralism discussed in the theory chapter of this study. 
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The Legislative Framework for the Recognition of Traditional Leaders in South Africa: 
 
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
A primary function of the TLGFA is ‘to provide a statutory framework for leadership 
positions within the institution of traditional leadership, the recognition of traditional leaders 
and the removal from office of traditional leaders’64. The Preamble to the Act further states 
that ‘the institution of traditional leadership must be transformed to be in harmony with the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights so that…democratic governance and the values of an open 
and democratic society may be promoted’65. 
According to s1 of the Act, king or queen ‘means a traditional leader’; senior traditional 
leader ‘means a traditional leader of a specific traditional community who exercises authority 
over a number of headmen or headwomen in accordance with customary law, or within 
whose area of jurisdiction a number of headmen or headwomen exercise authority’. 
Traditional leadership is defined as ‘the customary institutions or structures, or customary 
systems or procedures of governance, recognised, utilised or practised by traditional 
communities’; headman or headwoman ‘means a traditional leader who is under the authority 
of, or exercises authority within the area of jurisdiction of, a senior traditional leader in 
accordance with customary law; and is recognised as such in terms of this Act’66. It must be 
noted that by listing these definitions, the TLGFA envisions a tiered system of governance 
within traditional communities, in line with governance practice under customary law, as is 
reflected by s8 of the TLGFA described below. Section 8 of the TLGFA deals with the 
recognition of traditional leadership positions. 
Section 2 of the TLGFA requires that the premier of a province recognise a traditional 
community situated in their province. Recognition of a community as a traditional 
community may only be conferred by the premier if the community is ‘subject to a system of 
traditional leadership in terms of its customs, and observes a system of customary law.67’ The 
Act establishes a framework in which a community can only be deemed traditional if it has a 
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traditional leader, and that customary law cannot be practiced by a community if it does not 
have a traditional leader. This definition of traditional community is quite innocent when 
perceived in the neutral language of the legislation presents it, but has serious implications 
when placed in a social context68. 
 
Case Study 1: Pilane and Another v Pilane and Another 
This case involved a dispute over legitimacy and authority amongst the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela, 
a traditional community resident in the Pilanesberg area in the North West Province of South 
Africa. The case heard in the Constitutional Court was an appeal against three interdicts 
handed down by the North West High Court in Mahikeng, by Landman J. The applicants, 
Mmuthi Kgosietsile Pilane and Ramoshibidu Reuben Dintwe, had attempted to secede with 
some community members from the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela traditional authority, which is 
represented by the respondents, Nyalala John Pilane and the Traditional Council of the 
Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Traditional Community. The applicants wanted to form a new tribal 
authority, the Bakgatla-ba-Kautlwale Pilane Motlhabe Tribal Authority69. 
 
The Court Proceedings 
In the High Court proceedings, the respondents had succeeded in having three interdicts 
granted against the applicants prohibiting them from representing themselves as the Bakgatla-
ba-Kautlwale Pilane Motlhabe Tribal Authority, and holding a meeting to discuss the 
prospects of secession from the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Traditional Authority70. Two key pieces 
of legislation involved in the case are the TLGFA and the North West provincial legislation 
recognising and regulating traditional authority and chiefs. Furthermore, the court identified 
as a matter of great concern, the fact that the conduct of the respondents in attempting to 
silence opposition within the traditional community, was unconstitutional. The case raises 
important questions about the negative effects of statutory recognition of traditional 
leadership and empowerment, especially in terms of accountability and democratic 
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deliberation. The grounds upon which the applicants sought to appeal the granting of the 
interdicts, was that ‘the grant of the interdicts occasions infringements of their rights to 
freedom of expression, assembly and association…[and] the constitutional principle of 
accountability, in so far as it pertains to traditional governance structures and leadership.71’ 
Additionally, this case serves a useful example of the realities of legal pluralism and the ways 
in which state law and customary law interact with each other, especially in a constitutional 
democratic order. ‘It is well established that customary law is a vital component of our 
constitutional system, recognised and protected by the Constitution, while ultimately subject 
to its terms. The true nature of customary law is as a living body of law, active and dynamic, 
with an inherent capacity to evolve in keeping with the changing lives of the people whom it 
governs.72’ An additional point of interest is the difference of approach to adjudicating 
customary law matters in the lower courts and the Constitutional Court. 
 
Accountability to the Community: 
One of the basic premises upon which traditional leadership is based, and which defines the 
relationship between chief and subjects is the saying “Kgosi ke Kgosi ka Batho”. Loosely 
translated, it means that a king is a king because of his people; that without subjects a king 
cannot be a king. However, this saying also encapsulates the way in which the legitimacy of a 
king is established in relation to his subjects in African culture; that leadership and decision-
making are a community affair, not the sole prerogative of the king. Most importantly, the 
king is accountable to his subjects, perhaps not in the particularly defined ways suggested by 
the constitutional democracy, but village/ community fora exist through which subjects may 
ascertain information about the king’s decisions, or gather to discuss grievances as a 
community. 
It was held in the majority judgment that traditional leadership now falls under constitutional 
supervision, just like all other forms of governance in South Africa. The Court reasoned that 
recognition of traditional leadership as part of South Africa’s democratic governance 
structure emanates from the Constitution and as such, traditional leaders are organs of state 
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and therefore required to perform their duties and functions in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution.73 The powers of traditional leaders are to be exercised in a manner consonant 
with the Constitution, accountable government being one of the principles upon which the 
Constitution is based, and a value which informs governance in South Africa74. Furthermore, 
constitutional principles such as openness, transparency, and responsiveness require the 
participation of citizens in decision-making, particularly at local government level75. 
 
Location of Traditional Leaders in Local Government: 
The recognition of traditional leaders as organs of state, empowered by the Constitution, and 
therefore subject to its supremacy, means that the nature of traditional leadership is 
significantly altered, and so is the relationship between traditional leaders and their subjects. 
The Bill of Rights which promises freedom, equality, and transparency amongst other rights, 
has transformed people from subjects to citizens in relation to their leaders. Significantly, the 
placement of traditional leadership as a function of local government76, in addition to 
provision of rights, has changed the way in which traditional leaders and subjects relate, thus 
establishing the need for engagement between subjects as citizens, and traditional leaders as 
organs of local government.  
 
Local government is the best or most essential site for robust and meaningful public 
participation to take place. This is due to the fact that municipalities, and or villages, 
represent discrete communities. Managing public participation and the expectations of 
communities at this level, as opposed to provincial or national level, is better facilitated 
because a community, although made up of individual people, shares a collective identity and 
tends to represent itself as a collective group rather than as individual people. This is because 
the problems that face a community are often shared by a number of individuals in a 
community and create a shared experience amongst individuals. This is more the case in 
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traditional communities whose collective identity is established through deeper affiliations 
such as clan, ancestral and language affiliations.  
 
It is a well-established fact in South Africa that local government in many provinces, and in 
both urban and rural areas, has performed disappointingly since the advent of constitutional 
democracy in South Africa77. Many of the failings of the post-apartheid democratic 
governance framework are felt and witnessed in communities, particularly in poor and rural 
communities, which is the sphere in which local government operates. It is hardly surprising 
then that conflict between communities and government often takes place at this level. In the 
context of the Pilane case the Constitutional Court stated that 
‘This Court has on more than one occasion recognised the significance of the rights 
to freedom of expression, association and assembly in the functioning of a 
democratic society. It strikes me that the exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression can be enhanced by group association. Similarly, associative rights can 
be heightened by the freer transmissibility of a group’s identity and purpose, 
expressed through its name, emblems and labels. These rights re interconnected and 
complementary. Political participation, actuated by the lawful exercise of these 
rights, can and should assist in ensuring accountability in all forms of leadership and 
in encouraging good governance…There is an inherent value in allowing dissenting 
voices to be heard and in doing so, permitting robust discussion which strengthens 
our democracy and its institutions.78’ 
 
The Minority Judgment 
The minority judgment, crafted by the Chief Justice and assented to by one other justice 
provides a practical example of the effects of weak legal pluralism on the recognition of non-
state legal orders. This part of the judgment placed a large amount of emphasis on the 
authority of the traditional leader, relying on a close and extremely narrow reading of the 
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TLGFA and the way it recognises and empowers traditional leadership. Reference was made 
to the fact that the TLGFA was enacted for the purpose of recognising traditional leadership 
in a manner consistent with the Constitution, yet is silent on the ways in which the traditional 
leader of the Bakgatla people is infringing the rights of the community to express dissent and 
seek accountability. If anything, the minority judgment replicates apartheid legal pluralism by 
emphasising the authority of the traditional leader, founding his legitimacy solely in terms of 
the state’s recognition, and leaving the role of the community and changing notions of 
customary law as living law unacknowledged. This judgment’s silence on the role played by 
the development of living law, a process deeply embedded in village level activism and 
dependent on active participation, is astounding. It does however, demonstrate the limitations 
inherent in legislative recognition of non-state legal orders, even when the legislation 
emanates from a politico-legal framework conducive to strong legal pluralism. 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act 
The Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA), despite having been struck down by the 
Constitutional Court, is an important aspect of this discussion as it forms part of the package 
of laws that empower traditional leaders and establish a sphere of authority for their 
leadership in communities. The CLRA has been declared unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court as Parliament did not follow certain procedural requirements when it 
brought the CLRA Bill into legislation. It was held in the Tongoane case79, that the Bill the 
CLRA was invalid because Parliament had failed to undertake public participation before 
enacting the legislation. Parliament claimed that this situation came about because the CLRA 
Bill was tagged incorrectly; an additional challenge by the applicants was that CLRA was 
unconstitutional on substantive grounds as it did not provide for their security of tenure80.  
Four communities were involved in the litigation which formed the basis of the Tongoane 
case. The Kalkfontein and Makuleke communities owned their land as a community, while 
the Mokgobistad community established rights over land in an area called Mayayane in the 
North West Province. The Dixie community occupy a farm called Dixie 240 KU in the 
Pilgrim’s Rest area of Limpopo Province. In the case of each community, the land they 
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occupy falls within the jurisdiction of what used to be tribal authorities, now known as 
traditional councils. The communities in question had been administrating the use and 
occupation of their land according to a system of indigenous law, and they were deeply 
concerned that their indigenous law based system would be replaced by the provisions of the 
CLRA. Of particular concern to the communities was the negative and potentially regressive 
impact of the CLRA would have on their indigenous law system which was naturally 
constantly evolving along with social processes taking place in the communities81. 
The community mounted two challenges, the first was aimed at the substantive provisions of 
the CLRA, and the latter challenge was premised on Parliament’s decision to pass CLRA as a 
Bill which does not affect the provinces, under section 75 of the Constitution82, instead of s76 
which governs the procedure for a Bill which does affect the provinces. 
A further source of disquiet for the litigants was the fact that their land would fall under the 
control of the traditional councils, which they were convinced would not be able to 
administer the land for the benefit of their communities, as the role and rule of traditional 
leaders and traditional councils in indigenous law was disputed by the litigants. For the 
purposes of this discussion, the substantive issues raised by the applicants in challenging 
CLRA are more important than the procedural challenge. The substantive challenge raised by 
the applicants’ impugned section 21 of the CLRA in particular, as it made provision for the 
traditional councils to exercise powers and perform functions in respect of the administration 
of communal land. The indigenous law based system they had in place worked on a 
democratic framework in which all adult community members had a say in matters pertaining 
to their land. The traditional councils would not necessarily continue with this framework. 
Under the Black Authorities Act, the State President was empowered to establish tribal 
authorities for African ‘tribes’ with or without regard for customary law, and whether such 
existed under customary law. Tribal authorities constituted the basic unit of administration in 
the areas to which the provisions applied. The CLRA before it was struck down, applied to 
these areas. According to the BAA tribal authorities could advise and assist ‘the government 
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and other regional or territorial authority’ with matters involving the development of land in 
their jurisdiction. These tribal authorities are now recognised as traditional councils under 
s28(4) of the TLGFA, subject to some changes regarding their constitution.83. While CLRA 
has been repealed, it is only a matter of time before parliament introduces similar legislation, 
in order to regulate the administration of communal land84. 
 
Contested Powers and Legitimacy of Traditional Leaders 
Case Study 2: Tongoane and Others v Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs and 
Others 
Despite having discussed this case above, I turn to it in this section for different reasons. The 
facts of the case provide a helpful context for the discussion that will take place in this 
section. The facts of the case are illustrative of a state of affairs common to many traditional 
communities all over South Africa. Furthermore, the legislative scheme described above has 
direct and material consequences for communities such as will be described using the facts 
from the Tongoane case85. The reaction to the enactment of the legislation is surprising given 
the aims stated in the preamble of the CLRA: ‘to provide for legal security of tenure [and]… 
to provide for the democratic administration of communal land by communities.86’ The 
CLRA made provision for the democratic administration of communal land by requiring 
communities to establish their own land administration rules, and to establish land 
administration committees. However, the legislation also empowers traditional councils to act 
as a land administration committees, subject to a caveat in subsection 4 of s21 that ‘when 
acting as a land administration committee… the functional area of competence is the 
administration of land affairs and not traditional leadership’87. Furthermore s22(2) states that 
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‘subject to s21members of a land administration committee must be persons not holding any 
traditional leadership position and must be elected by the community.88’ 
These provisions of the CLRA are ironic, given the legislation’s stated aims, and the reality 
that much of the land subject to communal ownership falls within the boundaries of former 
homelands, which were often ruled by despotic traditional leaders89. Attempts have been 
made using the TLGFA to democratise traditional councils by requiring that traditional 
council members be elected by the community. However, many traditional communities have 
failed to implement this system, and where attempts have been made, there have been 
allegations made by community members that the election process was not free and fair90. 
Additionally, traditional councils often work in close proximity to traditional leaders such as 
kings and are susceptible to co-optation through the king’s power, compromising the 
traditional council’s ability to represent ordinary community members and be accountable to 
them.91 
 
The Traditional Courts Bill: 
The TCB relies on the TLGFA for many of its definitions, especially relating to the 
definitions discussed above. A particularly alarming feature of the TCB is that it does not 
recognise the tiered system of traditional leadership described in the TLGFA, in respect of 
the traditional court system. Section 4 of the TCB92, which deals with the designation and 
training of traditional leaders, also deals with the composition of traditional courts. 
The TCB, envisions a traditional court system with a centralised presiding officer in the 
court, which is not consonant with customary law: ‘in reality, “traditional leaders” are not 
custodians of culture in the African cultural milieu. People of different ranks and stature are 
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custodians and repositories of knowledge, customs and practices.93’ Traditional leaders play 
an important role in their communities, however, community involvement is very important 
in matters relating to the administration of justice, as customary is based on a system of 
restorative justice. Chief (Nkosi) Phathekile Holomisa, a member of the South African 
Parliament and representative of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
(CONTRALESA), concedes that the Bill concentrates on the court at the level of the senior 
traditional leader, ignoring vital dispute resolution forums at levels above and below the 
senior traditional leaders’ courts in traditional communities94. 
Additional dispute resolution forums exist in traditional communities, such as those located 
within families which deal with family and household related disputes. Disputes between 
neighbouring families are often settled by clan leaders or elders, and village level disputes are 
resolved by headmen in their special forum. These dispute resolution forums and processes 
allow for the knowledge and history of a community’s customs to be recited and preserved, 
and used to settle disputes through interpretation and re-interpretation. Moreover, the senior 
traditional leader’s court will often be constituted by the senior traditional leader along with a 
council consisting of headmen, clan elders and leaders, and family heads95. The TCB does 
not reflect these nuanced dispute resolution protocols within traditional communities. It is in 
the lower level, community-based dispute resolution forums that processes of change and 
negotiation are occurring, as community members interpret customs through the lens of their 
lived reality. 
Providing for a structure of traditional courts which emphasises the role played by the various 
dispute resolution forums within a traditional community is beneficial to communities as 
these forums work on a participatory method of dispute resolution, in which emphasis is 
placed on the restoration of justice, rather than punishment, and the maintenance of harmony 
amongst the various individuals who make up the community. Maintaining this democratic 
and participatory space within traditional justice administration, could play a significant role 
in the speed with which customary law develops, and ensuring a democratic, and therefore 
constitutionally consonant process. Structuring the traditional courts in this way could also 
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have the impact of developing customary law in a way that recognises and entrenches rights 
to culture, and to belong to a cultural, religious or linguistic community as envisioned by 
sections 30 and 31 of the South African Constitution. 
The legislative recognition of traditional courts has been justified in terms of s211 and s212 
of the 1996 Constitution, and in terms of giving greater recognition to African systems of 
justice, especially restorative justice and reconciliation. Gasa suggests that there is a danger 
inherent in this approach as ‘traditional leaders are not [sole] custodians of culture in the 
African cultural milieu. People of different ranks and stature are custodians and repositories 
of knowledge, customs and practices.96’ Rule-making and the interpretation of customary law 
are processes deeply embedded within a community and its collective identity, as the rules 
and their interpretation are based on the community’s reality and relational dynamics. 
 
Impact of the Traditional Courts Bill on the Legislative Framework: Constraint of 
Negotiation Space? 
Chief Phatekile Holomisa, characterises the African justice administration system, of which 
customary law is an integral part, as ‘epitomised by traditional courts [which are] inclusive, 
democratic, open and welcoming to those who seek justice97’. He states further that ‘western-
value inspired courts [are]…intimidating, alienating, complicated, retributive, incarcerating, 
and expensive.’ He is of the opinion that opposition to the Bill emanates from the way it 
centralises power in traditional leaders, whereas African justice systems are based on layered 
authority operating in a network of dispute resolution forums within a community. 
 
There is much truth in the claim that Chief Holomisa makes about traditional courts, 
especially the ways in which they dispense justice, or rather, the ways in which they differ 
from ‘western-value inspired courts’. Furthermore, traditional courts have been in existence 
in South Africa for decades, long before the existence of the 1996 Constitution and the 
introduction of the Traditional Courts Bill98. Chief Holomisa is also correct in citing the fact 
                                                          
96Nomboniso Gasa ‘The Traditional Courts Bill: A Silent Coup?’ (2011) 35 SA Crime Quarterly 23,29 
97 Phatekile Holomisa ‘Balancing law and tradition: the Traditional Courts Bill and its relation to African 
systems of justice’ (2011) 35 SA Crime Quarterly 
98 Christa Rautenbach ‘Deep Legal Pluralism in South Africa’ (2010) 60 Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 143 
38 
 
that the TCB, at least the B15-2008 version of it centralises authority in the Court of the King 
in an African traditional community, when in fact African court systems tend to be layered 
throughout a community. However, he misses and additional point which raises concern 
about the TCB in in 2008 and 2012 versions: it establishes the jurisdiction of traditional 
courts in areas that are under the authority of a traditional leader, or tribal authority, and often 
these are areas which geographically conform to the boundaries of the Homelands, or 
Bantustans, created during apartheid as separate states for black people in order to deny them 
citizenship in South Africa. This situation has implications for the groups of people who have 
either bought, had restituted, or purchased before apartheid, land which falls within the 
general geographical jurisdiction of a traditional court. 
Due to the fact that in African customary law, a traditional leader is responsible for the 
administration and allocation of land, and holding it in trust for the community. In many 
traditional communities though, ownership of land is a contentious concept, as land 
traditionally belongs to the community as a whole, with community members given rights to 
use land in perpetuity within a family; however, some traditional leaders have abused their 
position as administrators of land, and additionally there have been groups of people within 
traditional communities who bought land for themselves, either due to non-acceptance of the 
chief’s authority, or because they sought to own land autonomously99.  
These are communities that generally prefer to administrate their land in a democratic ways, 
such as through the establishment of community property forums, in which all adult members 
of the community have a say in how the land is used, regardless of their standing from a 
gender or economic perspective100. That being said, there many benefits to living in a 
community under the rule of a traditional leader; despite some of the complaints made by 
members of some communities who are ruled by traditional leaders, there are many 
communities under traditional leadership where community members feel safe protected and 
have good relations with their traditional leaders. The reasons for this state of affairs are 
many: some traditional leaders have established somewhat democratic relations with their 
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subjects, especially since the advent on the 1996 Constitution, others enjoy having traditional 
leaders, especially in the tiered institutional system, where the customary law of the 
community is applied even handedly and without opposition to progress and the participation 
of community members in the application of customary law and decision-making.  
 
Many communities in South Africa relate quite closely with traditional leaders and want to be 
led by them101, but in a way that still allows for the full exercise and benefits of citizenship 
rights as promised and protected under the Constitution, and due to the experience of 
subjecthood under traditional leaders during the apartheid and colonial regimes in South 
Africa’s past. This presents quite a challenge for the development of customary law and the 
recognition of traditional leaders, as there is a tension between the sometimes autocratic 
method of traditional leadership and practice on the one hand; and the desire of people living 
in traditional communities to benefit from a conception of South African citizenship which 
empowers citizens through rights to equality, dignity and freedom. One of the issues this 
paper seeks to engage is finding a strategy that can accommodate traditional leadership in a 
framework that also fulfils the desire of rural people living in traditional communities to 
access and benefit from rights as protected in the Constitution of South Africa.  
Recognising traditional courts or community courts in a manner guided by the Constitution, 
and social realities of communities allows for a wider variety of people to access courts 
within their communities, and may assist in removing some of the problems identified with 
the TCB and in the ways in which it overlooks the complex ways in which many rural/ 
traditional communities are constituted. The Traditional Courts Bill (TCB), if appropriately 
amended as suggested in this paper, could play a significant role in the development of 
customary law as living law in a manner that reflects the rights to equality, dignity and 
freedom enshrined in the Constitution, and underpinned by the spirit, objects and purport of 
the Constitution; but also reflects the practices of communities as influenced by their lived 
realities. This is a process that should be undertaken organically within communities, on an 
incremental but ongoing basis, governed by their own needs and priorities. 
                                                          




By centralising power in the courts of the kings or chiefs, courts which are often not the first 
port of call in many communities, it privileges the voice of one powerful force within a 
community, and empowers it to make law in a top-down, undemocratic way, the effects of 
which are evidenced by much of the official customary in South Africa’s statute books. 
Privileging the voice of the chief over the voices of the community may cause great harm in 
developing customary law, especially in such a way as to eventually influence ad inform the 
content of common law in South Africa. These developments also demonstrate consonance 
with the constitution and indicate that there is sufficient room for customary law, cultural 
communities, and traditional leaders within the South African democratic space. Processes of 
democratisation and development of customary law are already under way, and if amended, 
the TCB could play a major role in protecting and enhancing the forums at community level. 
 
The framework of governance established by the legislative scheme discussed above, and 
which comes about as a result of the way in which the three pieces of legislation interact with 
each other is in conflict with the separation of powers doctrine. The TLGFA, TCB and 
CLRA, centralise the governance, justice administration and land administration in one 
institution. All three laws require the establishment of traditional councils, however final 
decision-making rests with the traditional leader. This is a concentration of power which 
conflicts with a fundamental principle of the 1996 Constitution, the separation of powers. It 
has been argued by some that the separation of powers does not apply to traditional 
leadership as it is an alien concept102 however, such reasoning is poor justification. 
Furthermore, traditional leaders now derive their powers and recognition from the 
Constitution, and therefore their powers must be exercised in a manner based on the 
principles fundamental to the Constitution, such as the separation of powers. 
 
Separation of Powers, the South African Constitution, and Traditional Leadership: 
This section of the paper shall not give a detailed description of the separation of powers 
doctrine, nor its particular application or operation in the South African Constitution, nor how 
exactly the institutions of government are arranged within this scheme, suffice to say why the 
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separation of powers was chosen as principle defining governance in South Africa post-1994; 
and in what ways the separation of powers has been actualised under the 1996 constitutional 
arrangement as opposed to the constitutional arrangement upon which apartheid South Africa 
was established. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa does not state explicitly that South Africa’s 
constitutional governance arrangement is based on the separation of powers. Instead, the 
separation of powers is inferred from the way the constitution establishes the powers and 
functions of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, the drafters of the 1996 
Constitution regarded the separation of powers as a means to securing democracy, good 
governance and transparency. It was believed at the time that establishing a governance 
framework informed by the separation of powers would ensure a distribution of political 
power between the branches of government, which would ensure that the branches would not 
usurp each other’s powers and functions103. 
It can be safely concluded that the Constitutional Assembly, when drafting the Final 
Constitution deliberately avoided entrenching the separation of powers explicitly in the 
Constitution. They may have foreseen that given the way in which constitutionally explicit 
relationships of power between the arms of government could be used detrimentally, as had 
been done during apartheid; and the reality that the relationships between the arms of 
government need to be flexible and allowed to shift as time goes on, it would probably be 
best to define the powers and functions of each arm of government individually, rather than 
dictate how they should relate, or be separate from, each other. By placing greater emphasis 
on the powers and functions of the arms of government, there is greater clarity on what they 
may and may not do, but the ways in which the checks and balances between them operate 
will differ and shift depending on context or the facts of a situation.  
According to Seedorf and Sibanda, this constitutional scheme came about as a response to the 
constitutional arrangement which had existed in South Africa before 1994. The pre-1994 
governance arrangement in South Africa was one in which Parliament and the executive were 
centralised with the judiciary playing a minimal role in administrative oversight. 
‘Furthermore, both in terms of formal constitutional law and in practice, legislative powers 
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were increasingly transferred to the executive, mainly from 1976 onwards.104’ When the Final 
Constitution was drafted, it was not necessary to explicitly state that the principle informing 
the constitutional arrangement was the separation of powers, but rather to empower the arms 
of government in such a way as to have separate powers and functions, yet be forced to 
engage each other through a system of checks and balances. In the First Certification 
judgment it was held that ‘the principle of separation of powers, on the one hand, recognises 
the functional independence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of 
checks and balances…prevents the branches of government from usurping power from one 
another.105’ 
The separation of powers should apply to traditional leadership in the same way as it applies 
to the branches of government described above. Moreover, it does not have to be an explicit 
separation, as is the case in the South African Constitution. An additional reason why the 
separation of powers must apply to traditional leadership is the fact that traditional leaders are 
unelected, and in many parts of South Africa, the legitimacy of traditional leaders is contested 
in different ways and for different reasons by community members. 
 
Conclusion: 
The rule of law requires that all law be certain, publicised and easily accessible. To this end, 
legislation is favoured means of meeting the requirements of the rule, as writing laws down 
makes them certain, easily accessible and public. However, as the discussion and analysis 
above demonstrates, legislation is not always the most effective means through which to 
recognise institutions and norms, especially those of non-state legal orders. In contexts where 
there is much social change, indeterminacy as to meaning, and claims to power and authority 
are contested, the limitations of legislation become particularly acute. In the context of the 
recognition of traditional leaders in South Africa, legislation has played a significant role in 
locating traditional leaders within the constitutional democratic governance structure. 
However, as the case studies demonstrate this has not necessarily led to certainty about the 
law. If anything, the enacted legislation and proposed legislation has not successfully created 
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certainty in the social context it is meant to operate in; it has exposed the reality that 
traditional communities and customary law are not settled concepts easily defined by legal 
centralist ways of viewing the law. Moreover, legislation has had the effect of upsetting 
processes of social transformation necessary for the establishment of balanced power 
relations between community members and their traditional leaders. A particular problem 
with the legislative recognition of traditional leaders is the way in which it emulates notions 
of African cultural identity and community constructed during apartheid and colonialism.  
The application of customary law, and the ways in which communities relate with traditional 
leaders is not uniform, as presented by the legislative scheme envisioned by CLRA, the TCB 
and the TLGFA. The administration of land especially presents variable relationships 
between communities and traditional leaders/ traditional authorities, as some communities 
living within the territorial jurisdiction of a traditional leader, own their land privately, either 
through purchase or from a land restitution claim. Furthermore, in some communities, 
community members contest the title of the traditional leader to the throne or question his 
legitimacy for a variety of reasons. 
Ultimately, what the legislative scheme for traditional governance overlooks is the reality 
that, the TLGFA and TCB entrench distorted meanings of community and belonging by 
making these concepts subject to the presence and leadership of a traditional leader. These 
meanings are deeply informed by colonial and apartheid era thinking, despite the fact that 
they are meant to represent a move away from this legacy. Both pieces of legislation, but 
particularly the TLGFA, reflect colonial and apartheid meanings and understandings of 
traditional leadership, customary law, and cultural practices and identities. The TLGFA 
entrenches these meanings as the definitions contained in it are used for definitional and 
interpretative purposes in the TCB and CLRA. The legislation overlooks the ever-evolving, 
dynamic, and complex nature of African cultures, thus reinforcing essentialist representations 
of culture, authority, and identity yet claiming to restore the dignity of African society. Socio-
cultural processes are represented as static and unsophisticated when they are in fact 
dialectical, dynamic and exist in multiple relationships and identities106. 
It is unwise to ignore or take for granted the complexity that exists within traditional 
communities and their relationships with traditional leaders, especially given the wide powers 
                                                          




that the legislative scheme confers on traditional leaders. These powers include control over 
the administration of land, adjudicative interpretation of customary law, and powers to 
govern rural areas. A further concern is the way in which the legislation places traditional 
leaders close to political elites such as Ministers and the President, who the legislation gives 
the power to recognise traditional leaders should disputes as to legitimacy arise. Moreover, 
the legislation does not indicate that community members have a large role to play in the 
interpretation of customary law, and the fact that customary law evolves continuously.  
Read together, the TLGFA, CLRA and TCB place great powers in traditional leadership 
institutions. These powers could be abused by traditional elites to maintain or further develop 
interpretations and understandings of customary law that exaggerate the powers of traditional 
leaders, while excluding community members from the development of customary law. 
Custom will continue to be defined in narrow, constraining ways that allow some traditional 
leaders to continue to behave with impunity107. 
There is an urgent need to rethink the way in which customary law is recognised in South 
Africa. Recognising customary law by only giving effect to s211 and s212 of the 
Constitution, which recognises traditional leaders, leads to a legislative language which gives 
great power to traditional leaders, but overlooks the involvement of communities in defining 
and interpreting the content of customary law. A more balanced approach needs to be taken, 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion  
 
Traditional leadership and customary law has been in an interactive relationship with state 
law for decades in South Africa. What has defined the interaction between the laws is the 
politico-legal doctrine in place at the time of each manifestation. During late colonialism and 
apartheid, the interaction between state law and customary law was informed by a politic-
legal framework of authoritarian and undemocratic rule, which produced a particular 
institutional logic. The politico-legal framework in which the current interaction of laws is 
taking place is one premised on democracy, freedom, equality and the rule of law. However, 
the old institutional logic of traditional leadership still informs the legislation meant to 
recognise traditional leadership in the constitutional politico-legal framework. As a result, the 
mechanisms for communities to hold their chiefs accountable are not reflected in the new 
legislation. This omission presents an impediment to the transformation of the institutional 
logic of traditional leadership, and is not consistent with the Constitution. 
The current manifestation of this interaction is not new or unique, except that it is taking 
place within the context of a constitutional democracy, in which the Constitution is supreme 
and ‘law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled.108’ In principle, the advent of constitutional democracy and its effect on the 
governance structures of South Africa, has redefined the way state and non-state law interact 
with each other. 
 
Legislative Framework for the Recognition of Traditional Leaders 
The legislative framework recognising traditional leadership in South Africa has been a major 
concern of this study. The legislative framework in many ways frames the ways in which 
state law and non-state law interact with each other, and plays a defining role in the way 
power is distributed at local level between traditional leaders and the communities they 
govern. Even though this study is a critique of legislation such as the TLGFA and TCB, there 
are some positive aspects of the legislation that must be acknowledged. In general terms, the 
rule of law requires, as a basic minimum, that all laws should be certain, clear and easily 
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ascertainable. One of the principal ways of achieving this requirement of legality is to write 
laws down on paper and make them publicly available and accessible. 
Legislation allows parties to know what their rights and duties are, and especially allows for a 
clear delineation of power. In the context of relations between state agencies and citizens, it 
enables citizens to know the limits of a state agency’s power, thus enabling citizens to 
articulate rights when attempting to hold the state accountable or limit the state’s interference 
with their basic liberties. Legislation is also meant to serve the purpose of regulating state 
agencies’ power, imposing duties and legitimating the power exercised by states agencies, 
especially in relation to citizens.  
An additional positive aspect of the legislative framework recognising traditional leaders is 
that it meets the requirements set out in ss211 and 212 of the Constitution which require that 
legislation be enacted to provide for the powers and functions of traditional leaders in South 
Africa. The recognition of traditional leadership as part of South Africa’s governance 
structures is important and necessary in order to promote the transformational agenda of the 
Constitution, and to reflect a diverse society. Furthermore, it is a means of ensuring respect 
for the rule of law, which has been dismissed from time to time in Africa, as a purely Western 
concept109. 
 
Reality: Context legislative framework operates in: 
The legislative framework recognising traditional leadership in South Africa meets the 
standard set by the rule of law in terms of procedural legality, by being publicly available and 
accessible. However, it does not meet the substantive requirement of legality as the statutes 
do not adequately regulate the powers of traditional leaders in relation to citizens in the 
communities in which they play a leadership role. Furthermore, the legislation does not place 
sufficient limitations on the powers of traditional leaders as neither the TLGFA nor the TCB 
provides for mechanisms through which citizens can hold traditional leaders accountable. As 
demonstrated by the cases studies, Pilane and Another and the Tongoane case, enabling 
community members to hold traditional leaders accountable is of grave importance, 
especially in resource rich traditional communities, and particularly in light of the fact that 
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traditional leaders are unelected officials of the state, at local government level. From the 
manner in which the legislation is drafted, it can be safely surmised that the underlying 
assumption regarding the relationship between traditional leaders and community members is 
uncomplicated and without conflict; furthermore, that social change in these communities has 
been minimal. 
The reality is that there are major social changes underway in many rural communities in 
South Africa, influenced by a variety of factors, a prominent one of which is the change in 
South Africa’s politico-legal framework. The advent of constitutional democracy and rights 
discourse has not left rural communities untouched, despite the distance of some rural areas 
from urban centres. This phenomenon is particularly acute in resource rich regions and areas 
where people have successfully claimed land through land restitution cases. The Tongoane 
and Pilane case studies illuminate the reality that community members do not always agree 
with the leadership of traditional leaders, nor necessarily need to have their land managed by 
them, but still form part of a broader community within a traditional community. 
Furthermore, the very idea of a traditional community is a problematic classification as many 
people living in so-called traditional communities might identify with the collective linguistic 
or clan identity but may not necessarily want to be led by a chief. In some cases, community 
members may have been forced to become part of a traditional community during apartheid 
but do not necessarily identify with traditional leadership. Even in more culturally settled 
communities, conflict is a reality as demonstrated by the Pilane case. A major complaint 
from members of traditional communities is a lack of space for public participation, 
particularly with regard to holding traditional leaders accountable. The legislative framework 
however, does not reflect this reality and provides little scope for public participation forums 
other than the traditional council. It appears though that the traditional council framework is 
not being implemented, and where attempts have been made to implement it there have been 
great difficulties. As demonstrated by the Tongoane case, there is a level of suspicion on the 
part of community members towards the idea of traditional councils. This is due to the history 
of tribal authorities, the administration entities traditional councils have been introduced to 
replace. In reality, simply changing the composition of the traditional council, and requiring 
that members be elected does not necessarily change the institutional culture established 
during the operation of tribal authorities. The introduction of traditional councils also does 
little to change the dynamics of power, heavily skewed in favour of traditional leaders, nor 
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does it improve prospects for ordinary community members to hold their leaders accountable. 
As mentioned in chapter four, traditional councils, even if elected, can be easily co-opted by 
the king as is demonstrated by the Pilane case, and used as an instrument to squash dissent 
and close down spaces for democratic participation, particularly in resource rich localities 
such as the platinum belt in the North West Province.  
This study demonstrates that legislation, particularly the framework it establishes, is not the 
only mechanism through which African customary justice systems and dispute resolution 
forums can be recognised. Legislation works well where institution-making and empowering 
an elite group is concerned however, it cannot come at the cost of hard-won freedoms and 
changes that ordinary citizens have struggled for and achieved. Legislation cannot be used to 
disempower citizens by closing down the spaces and methods that give rise to interlegality, 
nor can it be used to diminish participation by re-inscribing an unbalanced power 
relationship, such as that which existed between traditional leaders and their communities in 
the apartheid and colonial eras. This constitutes a breach of the substantive aspects of the rule 
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